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Commentary on ’Profits
Derived from Breach of Contract:
Damages or Restitution’*
Howard O Hunter
There is little with which to disagree in Professor Waddams’ paper on the
categorisation of damage recoveries in the cases posited, viz, those involving
a breach which results in benefit to the breaching party but no loss of any
consequence to the nonbreaching party. If the goal of contract remedies is to
compensate the plaintiff for loss, then, presumably, there should be no
recovery at all in such cases. At most there might be nominal damages to
compensate for some transaction costs or perhaps as a ’declaration of rights’.
In some of the cases considered by Waddams, breach might be considered to
be useful as a means to promote efficiency by moving the breaching party’s
performance to a higher valuing user.
Waddams intuits, as many might, that refusing a remedy against a party
who intentionally breaks a contract for personal or corporate gain could offend
the general population of traders. The usual expectations among repeat players
in a market will tend to inhibit those players from most contract breaches, but,
even so, they may expect the law to give some strong public signal that
breaches are disfavoured. The doctrine of efficient breach and the general
common law rules limiting liability for contract defaults are not consistent
with these expectations. The development of the common law limitations on
contract recoveries and the justifications for the doctrine of efficient breach
have been well covered by many different commentators. Waddams raises the
interesting question whether restitution, as a separate body of law, might
provide a basis for asserting a claim in a relatively small number of cases that
come close to unjust enrichment and in which the plaintiff might not otherwise
have a remedy.
The basis for an argument in support of some form of restitution-like
recovery lies in the basic compensatory damage formula for contract breaches.
In contract ’loss’ generally refers to the failed expectancy — the measure of
the disappointment for non-performance. The trier of fact must reconstruct a
hypothetical future from evidence adduced about past behaviour and
statements. If there is a writing, the terms of that writing impose additional
specific constraints on the trier of fact. When the breach amounts to something
as simple as a failure to deliver a promised chattel or service, the task is fairly
simple. The plaintiff gets the difference in cost between the contract price and
the cost of a substitute, or, in a few instances, the plaintiff may get the chattel
itself.
Another kind of compensation case discussed by Waddams also seems
simple. The contract calls for the provision of a service, such as fire protection,
* Commentary on ’Profits Derived from Breach of Contract: Damages or Restitution’, a paper
presented by Professor S Waddams at the Seventh Annual JCL Conference, Cambridge,
September 1996 and appearing in this issue of the Journal at 115.
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over a period of time. The service is not provided in breach of the contract, but
there is no fire and the absence of the service is of no consequence in the sense
that there is no loss that would have been avoided but for the breach.
Nevertheless, the party in breach should have to refund any payments made.
We might characterise this as rescission and restitution upon a failure of
consideration and that probably is an adequate description. But one might just
as well say that return of the purchase price is compensation to the plaintiff for
the protection expected and the proper measure of the failed expectancy. It
would also be ’unjust’ for the defendant to retain the contract price because the
defendant did not provide the quid pro quo, and, in this sense, the case could
take on some of the characteristics of restitution.
A breach of warranty provides another kind of compensation rule that may
have results quite different from those in other contract cases. The standard
measure is the difference in value between what was delivered and what was
warranted. The contract price is not a cap, and the recovery may be
substantially higher than the original contract price.1 The compensation is not
for a measurable loss but for a dashed hope. The law recognises in these cases
something akin to a proprietary interest in the expectations aroused by the
defendant’s own touting. The recovery ’restores’ the plaintiff’s expectation
and bears a resemblance to restitution, but is better characterised as a species
of promissory enforcement.
Waddams eventually concludes that restitution for an unjust enrichment in
a breach of contract case is appropriate only when three requirements are
satisfied.2 There are cases which fit these requirements, but the classification
may be both too broad and too narrow.
First, the plaintiff in almost every breach of contract case may be said to
have suffered the loss of an opportunity to bargain. That requirement does
little to identify the appropriate cases for a restitutionary recovery.
Second, the plaintiff who has an interest that could be protected by the
intervention of equity may present a stronger case for a restitutionary remedy
for a sharing of the proceeds. Disgorgement of the profits might be a substitute
for an equitable order. Consider, for example, the hypothetical case of a
famous athlete who breaches a contract to take advantage of a high paying
opportunity. With adequate notice the other party might be able to enjoin the
athlete from undertaking the other opportunity although equity would be
unlikely to force him to perform the original agreement.3 Without sufficient
notice, the other party’s only remedy would be damages. Measuring the
damage recovery by the gain from the breach might be useful as a post hoc
substitute for injunctive relief.
Third, the plaintiff who has a proprietary interest in information that the
defendant was contractually bound not to disclose might obtain similar relief.
1 See eg Chatlos Sys Inc v National Cash Register Corp 670 F 2d 1304 (3d Cir), cert
dismissed, 457 US 1112 (1982); Smith v Pembridge Associates Inc 440 Pa Super 410, 655
A 2d 1015 (1995).
2 (1997) 11 JCL 115.
3 The leading cases continue to be Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216; 118 ER 749 and Lumley
v Wagner (1852) 1 De GM & G 604; 42 ER 687. See generally Howard O Hunter, Modern
Law of Contracts, Warren Gorham & Lamont Inc, Boston, §13.05 (rev ed 1993 and supp
1996-2).
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In the United States the Snepp case is the analogue to the Spycatcher case.
Frank Snepp, a former CIA agent, wrote a ’kiss and tell’ book about his days
in the spy business in violation of his contract with the CIA. The United States
Supreme Court approved the imposition of a constructive trust in favour of the
government on the royalties from the book.4 Snepp’s contract breach was also
a form of ’taking’ and the court reasoned that the government, which had a
proprietary interest in the information, could recover the pecuniary value of
the information taken.
There are some cases that do not fit the mold. The losing construction
contract cases are among those. Neither a building contractor nor the owner
can specifically enforce a construction contract. In a proper case, one party or
the other might be able to get some form of injunctive relief, but the
intervention of equity in such circumstances will be rare. The contractor has
no more than the ordinary proprietary interest that is common to many
different contracting parties. Nevertheless, upon a breach by the owner, the
contractor can recover ’off’ the contract for the fair market value of the goods
and service provided to the date of breach even if that amount is substantially
greater than the proportional recovery under the contract would be.5 In the
United States the majority rule is that the contract price is not a cap, and the
contractor could wind up recovering more than the total contract price for
work that is less than what was contemplated under the contract.6 These cases
do not involve restitution of profits derived from a breach, but they do result
in the denial of any savings expected by the breaching party and the allocation
of all risks of loss (those of both parties) to the breaching party.
In sum, Waddams has provided some rough guides for those relatively few
cases in which restitution rather than traditional compensation seems to be the
norm. His approach is helpful in analysing these situations and provides a
basis for distinguishing the cases. On the whole, it may be just as well to treat
these cases as anomalies — though not without justification — in the general
scheme of compensatory damages.
4 US v Snepp 444 US 507 (1980).
5 American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §373(1) (1981). See eg US v
Algernon Blair Inc 479 F 2d 638 (4th Cir 1973); Scaduto v Orlando 381 F 2d 587 (2d Cir
1967); City of Philadelphia v Tripple 230 Pa 480, 79 A 703 (1911).
6 See eg IT Corp v Motco Site Trust Fund 903 F Supp 1106 (SD Tex 1994). But cf Johnson
v Bovee 40 Colo App 317, 574 P 2d 513 (1978).
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